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Abstract 
Focusing on developed countries, I present a model explaining how firms help determine rates of 
income inequality at the societal level. I propose that the manner in which firms reward 
individuals for their labor, match individuals to jobs, and where they place their boundaries 
contribute to levels of income stratification in a society. I argue the determinant of these three 
processes is due, in part, to systems of corporate governance affecting the power and influence of 
different organizational stakeholders, resulting in variance in the types of employment 
relationships that predominate in a society. I conclude with a discussion of the research 
implications of emphasizing employers and employment practices as key determinants of 
societal-level income inequality. 
 
Keywords: income inequality; employment relationship; internal labor markets; wage setting; 
job matching; firm boundaries; corporate governance; executive compensation  
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Despite Plutarch's millennia-old warning that "an imbalance between rich and poor is the 
most fatal ailment of all republics," income inequality in the United States (US), which increased 
22.5 percent between 1980 and 2011, is now greater than at any point since the onset of the Great 
Depression (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011). Other industrialized nations also experienced 
rising income inequality during this period, including Finland (17.8%), Germany (15.4%), Japan 
(20.6%), and the United Kingdom (UK) (32.9%), providing evidence of a broader, global trend. 
The implications of understanding this phenomenon are profound as a host of issues with great 
relevance, such as economic mobility, educational attainment, and life expectancies are found to 
be related to income inequality (Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).  
Not surprisingly, scholars from across the social sciences have aimed to better understand 
this phenomenon, typically advancing either market (e.g., skill-biased technological change, 
globalization) or institutional (e.g., unionization, minimum wages, and tax policy) explanations 
for its rise (Morris & Western, 1999). While providing many insights on the dynamics behind 
rising income inequality, these accounts leave significant variance unexplained. In particular, one 
of the challenges of existing theories is that they are often not substantiated by cross-national 
analyses (see DiPrete, 2007; Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997; Heyes, Lewis, & Clark, 2012). 
Income inequality is a complex phenomenon with many factors likely playing a role in its rise, 
and as such, opportunities exist for developing new ideas that can explain cross-national rates of 
income inequality, complementing and extending our current perspectives of the phenomenon. 
Taking an initial step toward this end, I introduce a model that suggests  a key factor 
determining rates of income inequality at the societal level are employers’ actions regarding how 
they structure employment relationships. Though not often considered in existing theories of the 
phenomenon, employers shape inequality by deciding how much to pay different workers in 
different jobs (Baron, 1984). Research has indicated that across developed countries, over the 
past several decades, both within- (Lazear & Shaw, 2009) and between-firm (Faggio, Salvanes, 
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& Van Reenen, 2010) income inequality has risen, and that much of that rise results from firms 
paying otherwise equivalent workers differently (DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 1996; Groshen, 
1991). In fact, studies have suggested that nearly 40 percent of the total variation in wages across 
countries emerges from similarly skilled workers being employed in firms that reward them 
differently (see Abowd & Kramarz, 1999). Because over 90 percent of the labor force in 
developed countries are employees of organizations (Marsden, 1999), research on income 
inequality can be importantly enhanced by taking into account decisions employers make about 
how to pay their workers, how they match workers to positions, and where employers place their 
boundaries (i.e., how many workers do they employ). These considerations will help determine 
the extent to which wages vary across different types of workers. How executives come to make 
decisions about how to structure their firms’ employment relationships, I argue, is a consequence 
of the power and interests of different organizational actors (March, 1962). I describe how 
corporate governance mechanisms allocate power to various organizational stakeholders and 
how these resulting power differentials affect the distribution of labor income in a society 
through the decisions executives make about how to structure their employment relationships 
Notwithstanding evidence suggesting employers play a significant role in determining 
societal rates of income inequality, contemporary organizational scholarship has been mostly 
silent about the phenomenon. A number of scholars have explored the consequences of wage 
dispersion at the intra-organizational level (for a review see Shaw, 2014) without much attention 
given to where inequality emerges. While organizational research has long examined 
employment practices – such as wage setting (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Larkin, Pierce, & 
Gino, 2012), executive compensation (Wade, O'Reilly, & Pollock, 2006), outsourcing (Davis-
Blake & Broschak, 2009), and layoffs (Budros, 1997) – the distributional consequences of these 
changing practices to society has also been largely overlooked. 
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Earlier conceptual work from the structuralist perspective did take seriously the role of 
employers in wage-setting outcomes. According to this view, organizations are a key source of 
income inequality because they provide unequal access to remuneration, rewards, and 
opportunities for advancement, independent of worker characteristics (Baron, 1984). This 
perspective failed to explain how firm practices aggregate to societal-level outcomes, however, 
as empirical research focused on explaining patterns of inequality within firms (e.g., Kalleberg & 
Van Buren, 1994). While an important area of inquiry, a singular focus on within-firm income 
inequality may mask the broader impact of these employer choices. For instance, strategies that 
lower within-firm income inequality, such as outsourcing and layoffs, may increase inequality 
within a society. As a result, explaining what gives rise to wage dispersion inside firms is not 
sufficient to explain income inequality within a country; rather, one must also consider how 
decisions made inside the firm influence the dispersion of wages throughout the labor market.  
In this paper, I introduce a model to explain how executives’ decisions regarding their 
firms’ employment practices influence societal rates of income inequality. That is, I theorize 
about factors that are determined by employers and associated with inequality, but are observed 
across countries where those factors will noticeably vary. For employers to help determine rates 
of income inequality necessitates that a country’s labor force be employed predominately by 
firms versus self-employment or employment in the informal economy. Thus, my model is most 
relevant for the study of labor income inequality in developed countries.  
I first argue that employers vary in the extent to which they hold an internal, 
organizational orientation or an external, market orientation (see Jacoby, 2005). This choice 
informs the types of employment practices employers use, and I examine the distributional 
impact of a set of those practices on society. Specifically, I explore how decisions made by 
employers about how they set wages, how they match workers (including executives) to 
positions, and where they place their boundaries affect income inequality at the societal level.  
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Second, to explain cross-national variation in the use of these practices and to introduce a 
set of factors that influence how employers come to these decisions, I leverage insights from 
power-dependence (e.g., Emerson, 1962) and socio-political theories of corporate decision 
making (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963). I take the perspective that organizations are a site of 
conflict among different stakeholders who have vested interests in these decisions (Freeman, 
1984; March, 1962). This perspective is relevant because the choices employers make about the 
types of practices to use help determine how resources are allocated to different stakeholders and 
as such, are subject to contestation (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, & Sterling, 2013).  
The paper is organized as follows: I begin with an overview of the literature on income 
inequality, focusing on some of the main explanations given for its rise. I then introduce my 
model of how employers influence societal rates of income. I conclude with a discussion of 
implications for theory and empirical research of the phenomenon. 
DEFINING AND EXPLAINING INCOME INEQUALITY 
Income inequality captures the distribution of income across participants in a collective, 
be it an organization, a region, or a country. Income is derived from a number of sources, 
including earnings derived from labor, business, and investments (e.g., capital gains, dividends, 
and interest) (CBO, 2011). Wealth, a distinct but related construct, captures the total value of 
assets a family or individual owns – including homes, investments, and other savings. While any 
discussion of economic inequality can be informed by considering both non-labor earnings and 
wealth, the model presented here is about the role of firms in the wage-setting process. 
Therefore, I focus solely on labor income inequality.1 
Income inequality is also distinct from poverty. Whereas inequality indicates disparity in 
how resources are allocated, poverty captures the number of individuals living in a state of 
resource deprivation. Although one aspect of income inequality could be high rates of poverty, a 
society can have high-income inequality and no poverty, or low-income inequality and high 
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poverty. Although in many countries the two measures are correlated, since the late 1960s, much 
of the developed world has seen rates of poverty decline while income inequality has risen 
(World Bank, 2012), suggesting that the factors that influence income inequality do not always 
have similar effects on poverty. Relatedly, income inequality differs from social inequality, 
which characterizes the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social 
positions in a society—such as class, race, or sex—and encompasses an array of areas, including 
access to education, healthcare, and voting rights (Sen, 1992). While there is often a reciprocal 
relationship between them, factors influencing income are distinct from those influencing social 
inequality, necessitating independent study of the phenomena (Kenworthy, 2007). 
Income inequality can be measured in a number of ways and each method captures 
somewhat different aspects of the phenomenon. For example, measures such as the Gini, Theil, 
and Atkinson indices consider the allocation of income throughout the income distribution. 
Others, such as simple ratios (e.g., top 1 percent, bottom 10 percent), and range ratios (e.g., 
90/10, 50/10 percentiles), focus on a single or ratio of points to draw inferences about the income 
distribution. The choice of measure is important as it contains "implicit judgments about the 
weight to be attached to inequality at different points on the income scale" (Atkinson, 1975: 47). 
For example, the Gini index – a measure of the extent to which of income among individuals or 
households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution – is most sensitive to inequalities in the 
middle and less sensitive to inequalities at the top and bottom of the distribution. Simple and 
range ratios capture dynamics at a pre-defined point(s), making them less useful for 
understanding dynamics throughout the distribution. Examining the top 1 percent of earners, for 
instance, provides few insights on how income is distributed within the top 1 percent as well as 
on distribution throughout the lower 99 percent (Ray, 1998). Because the model I present has 
implications for incomes throughout the distribution, for each employment practice discussed, I 
identify which parts of the income distribution are likely to be most affected. 
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Trends in Income Distribution 
 Prior analyses have revealed remarkable variety in rates and changes in income inequality 
across countries and over time (e.g., Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013; Roser & 
Cuaresma, 2014). Notably, as measured by the Gini index, between 1980 and 2011 income 
inequality rose considerably in diverse countries such as Australia (23.9 %), Poland (12.7%), 
Portugal (48.4%), and Sweden (29.1%); remained relatively unchanged in countries like 
Denmark (2.6%), France (4.7%), and Switzerland (- 1.5%); and declined in Ireland (- 8.9%) and 
South Korea (- 11.9%).2 Scholars from across the social sciences have attempted to explain this 
variance, focusing primarily on market- or institutional-based accounts. Before introducing my 
model, I summarize some of the most common explanations for income inequality, discuss their 
limitations, and suggest that incorporating the study of employers and employment practices may 
complement these existing perspectives. There are a number of reviews on the topic (e.g., Katz 
& Autor, 1999; Levy & Murnane, 1992; McCall & Percheski, 2010; Neckerman & Torche, 
2007), so I cover the literature briefly.3 
 Technological Development  
Efforts to explain income inequality have been developed primarily within the field of 
neo-classical labor economics (DiPrete, 2007). Orthodox economic theory explains wage 
differentials as being the product of variations in worker productivity and supply and demand. 
Following this tradition, skill-biased technological change (SBTC) has emerged as one of the 
most widely-cited drivers of income inequality. The SBTC argument states that income 
inequality reflects changes in the relative supply of skilled labor and exogenous technological 
change. Technologies enhance the marginal productivity of skilled workers while either lowering 
or leaving unchanged the marginal productivity of unskilled workers (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 
2008; Johnson, 1997). One of the most popular technologies examined is the microcomputer, 
which increases the demand for those with the requisite education and skills while making 
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possible the routinization of certain types of work, rendering many middle-wage jobs expendable 
(Acemoglu, 2002; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Violante, 2002). 
Globalization 
A related account for rising income inequality is that it is a consequence of globalization 
(Bentele & Kenworthy, 2013; Dreher & Gaston, 2008). Much of the early study on globalization 
and income inequality focused on trade flows. Two theoretical arguments, the Hecksher-Ohlin 
model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, speculate that as less-developed countries integrate 
into the world economy, the demand for and returns to unskilled labor increase in those 
countries, reducing income disparities. Conversely, the demand for skilled labor in developed 
countries increases while the demand for low-skilled labor declines, exacerbating disparities 
(Leamer, 1995). Empirical research, however, has not supported these accounts. Studies found 
income inequality rose in developing countries as they integrated into the world economy 
(Harrison, McLaren, & McMillan, 2011). More recent research on the impact of globalization on 
wages and employment has examined the geographic shifts in the production of goods. For 
example, studies of the impact of China’s manufacturing sector’s ascension have found it to have 
a detrimental impact on manufacturing employment and wages (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2013).  
Unionization and Wage Bargaining 
Another widely-cited explanation for rising income inequality is declining rates of 
unionization (e.g., Jacobs & Myers, 2014). Research on unions and income inequality focus 
primarily on two effects. First, a between-group effect whereby unions raise wages among less-
educated workers, thereby reducing inequalities between occupations. Second, a within-group 
effect as collective bargaining standardizes wages within firms and industries, thereby reducing 
differences between workers with similar characteristics (Freeman, 1980; Western & Rosenfeld, 
2011). Research also suggests spillover effects in which the threat of unionization encourages 
non-union firms to adopt similar employment practices (Farber, 2005). Supporting these claims, 
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Card (2001) found that 15 to 20 percent of increases in income inequality in the US between 
1970 and the early 1990s was due to declines in unionization; Fortin and colleagues (2012) 
found similar results in Canada. Countries with greater unionization densities have, on average, 
lower rates of income inequality (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen, 2005), as do those with more 
centralized wage-b argaining systems as centralization mutes the influence of different groups on 
the wage-setting process (Oskarsson, 2005). 
Public Policy 
Economic, political science, and sociological research also points to the direct role of 
public policy in impacting societal-level income inequality (e.g., Heathcote, Perri, & Violante, 
2010; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005). This literature has focused heavily on two policy-related 
outcomes: minimum wage and tax rates. When a minimum wage rate is increased, the overall 
wage distribution is impacted by both a direct effect as workers earning less than the future 
minimum rate receive a wage increase, and an indirect effect wherby the wages of many workers 
above the minimum are increased so as to retain the relative wage ranking of occupations within 
firms (Morris & Western, 1999). Combined, these two effects reduce income inequality by 
increasing wages at the lower end of the wage distribution (see Blackburn, Bloom, & Freeman, 
1990; DiNardo et al., 1996; Volscho, 2005). Others have suggested that income concentration is 
an artifact of tax law, as across countries and over time, higher marginal tax rates are associated 
with lower after-tax inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013), as are specific tax policies aimed to 
redistribute earnings (Neumark & Wascher, 2001). In fact, some scholars have argued that over 
the long run, public policy intervention is the primary predictable mechanism through which 
income inequality can be reduced, emphasizing that political decisions help determine how 
income in a society is distributed (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Piketty, 2014). 
Limitations of Existing Research 
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 Each of the aforementioned research streams have made important contributions to our 
understanding of factors affecting rates of income inequality. However, while providing many 
valuable insights, these accounts do leave some key questions unanswered. In particular, these 
accounts do not always hold up to cross-national comparison. For example, comparable levels of 
income inequality have not been observed in countries such as those in Continental Europe, 
Japan, and Scandinavia, despite these countries’ heavy adoption of computer technologies (Lin 
& Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Also, rates of income inequality in many countries began climbing 
before the widespread introduction of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and 
stabilized in the 1990s when ICTs were more widely diffused (Card & DiNardo, 2002; DiPrete, 
2007; Katz & Autor, 1999). Data from countries such as Austria, Finland, Italy, and Sweden 
suggest that high and increasing levels of union density have not prevented increases in income 
inequality (Heyes et al., 2012). Many countries with low rates of income inequality have no or 
limited minimum wage laws (Card, Heining, & Kline, 2013), and minimum wages tell us little 
about changes throughout the wage distribution. Given the vast differences in tax law across 
developed countries, cross-national comparisons in this area have also proven challenging 
(Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997). 
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon, it stands to reason that a singular, universal 
explanation of income inequality is unlikely to emerge, and there is seemingly ample opportunity 
to develop new theories of how income inequality in a society is determined. Given the vital role 
played by firms for wage-setting outcomes, an organizational theory-based perspective on 
income inequality may be a particularly valuable addition. In particular, a firm-centered theory 
may help address some empirical puzzles plaguing existing theories of income inequality. For 
instance, that technology has not led to rising income inequality in many countries may be due to 
how those technologies are adopted by firms (Fernandez, 2001). Evidence also shows that 
otherwise equivalent establishments located in different countries and establishments of the same 
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firm across countries vary in the employment practices utilized (e.g., Finegold & Mason, 1999; 
Siegel & Larson, 2009). As such, a firm-centered account can help link market and institutional 
factors to individual outcomes by highlighting how a firm’s broader macro environment gets 
translated into firm practices that impact workers (Baron & Bielby, 1980).  
 In the sections below, I introduce my model of how employers impact income inequality 
at the societal level (see Figure 1). I first describe how employers generate inequality through the 
processes of wage setting, job matching, and boundary placement. I then describe factors that 
may influence how executives enact these three processes.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
FIRMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Human Resource Systems and Firm Strategy 
A number of typologies of employment exist, including that from Boxall and Purcell 
(2011), Lepak and Snell (1999), and Sonnenfeld and colleagues (1988). I borrow from Jacoby’s 
(2005) typology as it is the most parsimonious yet still captures differences in employment 
dynamics relevant to the study of income inequality. According to Jacoby (2005), systems of 
corporate employment can be categorized broadly into two ideal types: organizational or market 
oriented. Table 1 outlines some basic features of each type of system. The main distinction 
between the two systems is the extent to which they rely on internal (i.e., organizational) versus 
external (i.e., market) criteria in the structuring of employment relationships. An organizational 
focus is associated with stable employment with low turnover, extensive use of training, and the 
dominance of internal considerations – such as a desire for equity – on executive decision 
making. In such a system, employers protect workers from many of the vagaries of market 
forces; they take a longer-term perspective on performance and favor corporate strategies that 
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necessitate a stable, well-trained, and loyal workforce. A market focus, on the other hand, is 
characterized by flexible employment relationships with higher turnover, fewer opportunities for 
training, and pay and allocation decisions based on external criteria. The shorter-term orientation 
discourages employers from bearing market risks on behalf of their workers and encourages 
them to utilize employment practices that lower costs and increase flexibility (Kalleberg, 2011).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Whether a firm adopts an organizational or market orientation is related to the firm’s 
choice of employment practices (Jacoby, 2005; Kalleberg, 2011). I focus here on a set of 
practices likely to impact the distribution of income in a society, arguing that firms generate 
income inequality through how they reward workers (including executives) for their labor, how 
they match them to jobs, and where firms place their boundaries (i.e., how many workers the 
firm employs). In countries where a higher proportion of employment is in firms using an 
organizational (market) orientation, I argue income inequality will be lower (higher). 
Importantly, employers fall along a continuum between having an organizational versus market 
orientation, and firms do not necessarily utilize one strategy but often use combinations of both 
(Siegel & Larson, 2009). That is, within a given firm, some workers can be governed by 
employment relationships based on external market considerations while other workers are 
governed by organizational considerations (Lepak & Snell, 1999). Nonetheless, the emphasis 
here is on the consequences to society of the relative propensity of firms to pursue a market 
versus an organizational orientation and the types of practices they are likely to utilize as a result.  
Wage Setting and Job Matching 
Neo-classical economics emphasizes that income differentials are the result of unequal 
endowments in productive capacities among individuals; therefore, individuals with identical 
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skills should obtain relatively equivalent earnings regardless of the job they are in (e.g., Becker, 
1964). Wages, however, are typically tied to jobs rather than individuals (Granovetter, 1981; 
Thurow, 1975), and once we allow features of a job to influence wage outcomes, how firms 
match workers to positions and how they reward workers for their labor become important 
determinants of how labor income is distributed in a society (Sørensen & Sorenson, 2007).  
An internal, organizational orientation toward wage setting is consistent with the use of 
internal labor markets (ILMs), whereby "pricing, allocation, and training decisions are governed 
by a set of administrative rules and procedures" rather than by external market forces (Doeringer 
& Piore, 1971: 1-2), and workers' jobs and wages are insulated from external market forces 
(Cappelli, 2001). One of the more evident manifestations of this approach is in the wage-setting 
process. Historically, the most common method used by larger firms to set compensation was 
through job evaluation – a formalized system for ascertaining the relative value of different jobs 
in a firm (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010) – which was utilized, in large part, to 
reduce wage inequality inside of firms (Sanchez & Levine, 2012). For example, in a prototypical 
point-based job evaluation system, such as the Hay System that emerged in the 1940s and gained 
worldwide popularity over the ensuing decades, each job is evaluated along dimensions such as 
required skill, effort, scope of responsibility, and working conditions (Boxall & Purcell, 2011). 
Jobs are then assigned wages based on their value to the firm and in relation to other jobs within 
the organization. Though jobs that require greater levels of competencies and are more highly 
valued by the firm receive greater pay, historically these systems were developed to create a 
sense of internal pay equity (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). By assigning wages to the job and 
establishing criteria by which jobs are compared, employers hope to mitigate perceptions of 
inequity in how wages throughout the hierarchy are set (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).  
There are at least two factors, then, that suggest the presence of ILMs across a population 
of firms will reduce income inequality in a society (see Figure 2). First, to ensure internal equity 
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across jobs, firms utilize administrative procedures – guided by concerns for internal equity – 
that set appropriate pay differentials across jobs, implying greater equality of compensation than 
would otherwise exist, and that lower within- and between-group income differentials. Second 
and relatedly, ILMs are typically associated with a wage premium that is greater for lower- than 
higher-skilled workers (Groshen & Levine, 1998), suggesting a between-group effect whereby 
wages are more compressed between lower- and higher-skilled workers than would be otherwise. 
In fact, in countries like Japan, the UK, and the US, income inequality was at its lowest levels 
when ILMs predominated, and the breakdown of ILMs coincided with rising income inequality 
in a number of countries (Cappelli, 2001; Davis & Cobb, 2010). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Unlike in ILMs, the use of market-based employment practices reduces the influence of 
bureaucratic processes that determine hiring, promotion, and remuneration. Opening them to 
competition affords firms greater flexibility in how they manage their employment relationships; 
this competition appeals to firms who favor a market orientation (Jacoby, 2005). The 
consequences of a market-based employment relationship on income inequality are also 
significant. Rather than wages being set through evaluation systems that promote internal equity, 
in external labor markets, wages are more likely to be based on the relative quality of workers, 
evidenced by performance, skills, and credentials, as well as on the broader market forces of 
supply and demand. Individual variations in performance can be significant (Schmidt & Hunter, 
1981), and market-oriented wage setting reveals and reflects these variations through pay 
differences. As such, wage-setting systems that reward workers based on their productivity, such 
as is the case in pay-for-performance schemes, can lead to higher levels of income inequality 
since they increase the wage gap between more and less productive workers (Bandiera, 
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Barankay, & Rasul, 2007; Lemieux, 2011). In the US, the use of these schemes, which are more 
common among higher-income workers, is responsible for over 20 percent of the rise in income 
inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s (Lemieux, MacLeod, & Parent, 2009). A 
number of studies have also substantiated that worker wages are positively correlated with firm 
profitability (e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald, & Sanfey, 1996; Gürtzgen, 2010) and found an 
increased use of firm-based compensation practices such as bonuses and stock options (e.g., 
Kruse, Freeman, & Blasi, 2010). Wages, then, for workers with similar skills but in different 
firms will vary based on disparities in firm performance.    
Similarly, when hiring occurs largely from outside of the firm, information asymmetries 
between workers and employers are likely to impact wages. Bidwell (2011) argued that 
differences in pay between external and internal hires should reflect differences in the observable 
characteristics between the two types of candidates. Firms have less knowledge of external 
candidates’ unobservable skills and talents. To compensate for this, these candidates typically 
have greater levels of observable traits, such as education and credentials. Because those 
observable traits are easily transferrable across firms, whereas unobservable characteristics – 
such as tacit knowledge (Althauser & Kalleberg, 1981) or culture fit (Chatman, 1991) – are not, 
observable characteristics are more highly rewarded in the labor market. Moreover, because 
external hires lack information about their fit for the job and within the firm, they must be 
compensated for the increased risk they bear by switching employers. External hiring, then, can 
lead to higher income inequality at the societal level because in comparison to individuals 
lacking them, employees with greater levels of visible credentials and stronger social networks 
receive greater rewards (Bidwell, 2011; Bridges & Villemez, 1986). Likewise, when hiring 
occurs predominately from outside the firm, younger and lower-skilled workers are often sorted 
into and remain in lower-paying jobs (Autor & Houseman, 2010), as are women and minorities 
(Prokos, Padavic, & Schmidt, 2009). Rather than individual attainment being a function of 
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bureaucratic procedures, careers span across firms with little predictability (Bidwell & Briscoe, 
2010), implying greater variance in wage outcomes for similarly skilled individuals. In short, 
where firms rely more heavily on market-oriented wage setting and external hiring, we should 
see movement away from the middle of the income distribution towards the tails, leading to 
greater wage dispersion at the societal level.  
Proposition 1: In countries where workers are employed by firms favoring the use of external 
labor market rather than internal labor market mechanisms to set wages and match workers to 
jobs, income inequality at the societal level will be higher. 
Executive Compensation 
One factor regularly cited for why income inequality has risen over the past 35 years is 
the gap in wages between the highest earners – those in the upper 1 or .01 percent – and all other 
earners (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2011). The average annual earnings of the top 1 percent of wage 
earners in the US grew 275 percent from 1979 to 2007 (CBO, 2011). Those in the remaining top 
20 percent, the middle 60 percent, and bottom 20 percent grew by 65, 40, and 18 percent, 
respectively (Kim, Kogut, & Yang, 2013). Understanding overall changes in income inequality, 
therefore, can be markedly enhanced by considering the influence of top incomes.  
Though salaries in many professions, such as those for professional athletes, celebrities, 
and finance professionals increased dramatically during this period (Kaplan & Rauh, 2009), data 
show that in countries such as Germany (Bach, Corneo, & Steiner, 2009), the US (Bakija, Cole, 
& Heim, 2012), Australia and the UK (see OECD, 2011: 351), non-financial executives, 
managers, and supervisors constitute the largest occupational category of the highest earners. 
Across countries, there is considerable variance in the relative pay of executives to the median 
worker. For example, in 2012, the ratio of CEO pay to the median worker was 58 to 1 in 
Norway, 67 to 1 in Japan, 104 to 1 in France, 147 to 1 in Germany, and 354 to 1 in the US (The 
Globalist, 2013). Given the representation of executives among top earners and the stark cross-
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national differences in how well compensated they are relative to the average worker, how firms 
set compensation for executives plays a key role in determining a society's level of income 
inequality. I examine three ways in which firms set the compensation of their executives that 
may influence societal levels of income inequality: performance-based pay, external 
benchmarking, and external hiring.  
Performance-based pay and external benchmarking. Over the past several decades in 
many developed countries, there has been an effort to tie executive compensation more closely to 
metrics of firm performance. In particular, across many countries, executive compensation 
schemes increasingly include equity compensation, whereby options to purchase shares of stock 
at a set price are granted to management on the basis of firm performance (Murphy, 2013). 
Where firm performance outpaces wage growth – such as in the US where between 1990 and 
2005 when average worker wages increased 4 percent while corporate profits increased 107 
percent – inequalities in income will increase. Specifically, the upper tail of the income 
distribution will shift outward.  
Interestingly, however, a tighter coupling of executive compensation and firm 
performance does not seem sufficient for explaining the growth in CEO wages. Notably, 
evidence confirms that in many places, CEO pay has outpaced firm performance, growing 298 
percent in the US during this same period (Anderson, Cavanagh, Collins, & Benjamin, 2006). 
One reason for the outpaced growth of executive wages results from how executive 
compensation gets set. Notably, a number of studies have examined the practice whereby 
corporate boards, often aided by compensation consultants, benchmark the pay of their 
executives to those of other firms (see Kim et al., 2013). When benchmarking, executive 
compensation is targeted at a specific range (e.g., 50th, 75th, 90th) of the benchmarked firms; 
rarely ever is it below the median (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008). If most firms use external 
benchmarking and aim to pay at or above the median, pay will increase due to the upward bias in 
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target and the repeated "leapfrogging" of firms (Elson & Ferrere, 2013). Moreover, this 
benchmarking system creates feedback loops such that the decision by a small number of 
corporate boards to dramatically increase executive pay has a sizeable influence on executive 
pay at other firms (DiPrete, Eirich, & Pittinsky, 2010). When creating the benchmark, boards 
often include a set of aspirational firms that are larger and employ considerably higher paid 
executives. For example, in 2012, the median firm on Viacom’s benchmark list was 56 percent 
larger by market capitalization and had double its revenues (Mider & Green, 2012). Thus, even 
where a firm sets its benchmark at the median of its benchmark group, that group is often 
upwardly biased, making an executive’s pay much greater than the median of a comparable set 
of firms. As a result, the use of external benchmarking to set pay has the potential to drive 
executive income higher than would be expected by rising corporate profits alone.  
Potentially, a firm could set wages for all its workers via external benchmarking; 
however, for a number of reasons, it is unlikely this would curb rising income inequality. First, in 
many settings, because executive compensation is tied more closely to firm performance than it 
is for most workers, to the extent that corporate profits exceed workers’ returns to their marginal 
product, income inequality will increase. Second, because executive wages are considerably 
higher than those of the average worker, worker wages would have to increase at a higher rate 
than that of executives to prevent inequality from growing. Third, the incentive for firms to set 
worker wages above the median and to use a biased benchmark group is likely to be lower than 
when benchmarking for executives. Therefore, to the extent that firms use external 
benchmarking to set pay, we should see higher rates of income inequality at the societal level as 
the right tail of the income distribution will grow and shift outward.  
In contrast, employers can rely on internal benchmarking of CEO pay, whereby the CEO 
wage is set in comparison to the salaries of those employed in the company. In some of the 
earliest analyses of executive compensation, researchers considered the possibility that 
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executives were paid on the basis of comparison to other employees of the firm (e.g., Simon, 
1957) or a combination of comparing executive pay to that of similar firms and utilizing internal 
comparison (Patton, 1951). Firms such as Whole Foods cap CEO pay at its average annual wage, 
while others such as Northwestern Corporation ensure that executive compensation is "internally 
equitable and consistent" (Brancaccio, 2012). Where executive compensation is determined in 
larger part by internal benchmarking, the ratio of executive pay to that of the average workers is 
likely to be somewhat constrained. To the extent that this practice is common in a society, top 
incomes are likely to be reduced, thereby lowering aggregate income inequality. 
Proposition 2a: In countries where firms favor the use of performance-based pay systems to 
remunerate executives, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.  
Proposition 2b: In countries where firms favor the use of external rather than internal 
benchmarking to set executive pay, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.  
External hiring. Another factor linked to rising executive compensation is the increased 
incidence of firms recruiting CEOs from outside of the organization. During the 1970s in the US, 
fewer than 15 percent of newly appointed CEOs were hired externally. By the late 1990s, nearly 
a third of all CEO appointments came from outside of firms (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2008). Much 
in the same way that external hiring of workers alters the demand for observable skills, the 
utilization of external hiring represents a shift in the reliance on general managerial versus firm-
specific skills. Such a shift increases competition for skilled labor in the executive labor market, 
driving up wages (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2008). To compensate executives for the loss in future 
value of their firm-specific investments, the hiring organization may also need to pay a premium 
to entice an executive to switch firms (Harris & Helfat, 1997). In fact, many of the more 
generous executive compensation packages have been the result of contracts negotiated with 
external candidates at the time of hire, not deals reached with incumbents (Murphy, 2013). 
Combined, these factors suggest that the reliance on external hiring of executives is likely to be 
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associated with higher levels of compensation, thereby exacerbating income inequality by 
increasing the size of the right tail of the country’s income distribution and shifting it outward. 
Proposition 2c: In countries where firms favor the use of external rather than internal hiring to 
match executives to their positions, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.  
Firm Boundaries: Who and How Many to Employ 
Non-standard work arrangements. The prototypical standard employment relationship 
consists of stable, full-time employment in which the worker is employed directly by the firm. 
Executives can, however, organize work utilizing a number of arrangements that fall under the 
umbrella term non-standard work, which includes contracting, outsourcing, temporary work, and 
part-time employment (Cappelli & Keller, 2013a). Non-standard work arrangements differ from 
standard ones in a number of ways, including administrative control often being handled by a 
third-party organization (such as in the case of temporary and contract labor), and no expectation 
of continued employment (Kalleberg, 2011). When making the decision to use non-standard 
work arrangements, executives may be motivated by a variety of factors, such as increasing the 
firm's flexibility or lowering economic and social comparison costs (Autor, 2003; Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2008). In general, employers favoring a market orientation are more likely to utilize 
these non-standard work arrangements (Kalleberg, 2011). Not surprisingly, researchers have 
begun to explore the causes and consequences of these work arrangements for employers and 
workers (Cappelli & Keller, 2013b; Dube & Kaplan, 2010; Peck & Theodore, 2007). Few 
efforts, however, have been made to connect their spread to rising levels of income inequality. 
In part-time and temporary arrangements, workers are employed directly by the focal 
firm but at rates typically below what is earned by full-time employees. Because many workers 
are employed in these positions involuntarily and often face constraints in the number of hours 
they can work, total labor income inequality is likely to increase as a result of these 
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arrangements. As part-time and temporary workers are utilized in place of full-time workers, we 
should expect societal rates of income inequality to rise. 
When employers externalize employment through use of outsourcing or offshoring, the 
distribution of jobs within the organization changes. Entire functions and departments are 
routinely extricated from the firms' boundaries and handled by outside vendors. For example, 
Cappelli (1999: 74) recounts how IBM outsourced all clerical jobs below the rank of executive 
secretary to employment agencies like Manpower Inc. Research has shown that outsourced 
employees have fewer opportunities for promotion and training than those retained in-house 
(Walsh & Deery, 2006). Moreover, in a study of outsourcing of janitors and security guards, 
Dube and Kaplan (2010) found that outsourced workers earn routinely less than in-house 
employees, and that this is in large part due to mid- to high-paying jobs turning into lower-
paying jobs or being removed altogether (see also van Jaarsveld & Yanadori, 2011).  
By outsourcing, firms can keep the wages and conditions of employment closer to market 
rates without disrupting norms of equity (Cappelli, 1999; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). In so 
doing, these jobs become separated from ILMs that reduced the wage disjuncture across 
hierarchical levels and between occupations. While some high-skilled contract workers benefit 
from such arrangements (Kunda, Barley, & Evans, 2002), the vast majority of contract workers 
are employed in low- or middle-wage jobs. In the case of firms moving or outsourcing jobs to 
vendors in a foreign country, domestic income inequality is likely to rise due to higher 
unemployment. Outsourcing and offshoring, therefore, should be associated with greater levels 
of income inequality at the societal level. In particular, we should see a hollowing of the middle, 
growth in the left tail, and potentially modest growth in the right tail of the income distribution.  
Proposition 3: In countries where workers are employed by firms favoring the use of non-
standard work arrangements, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.  
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Layoffs. Another market-oriented practice firms use to alter their boundaries is 
performing layoffs – a termination of employment for reasons generally out of an employee's 
control. Typically, employers utilize layoffs in an effort to improve the firm’s efficiency 
(Hallock, 2009). While layoffs can be temporary, here I focus on permanent terminations. In the 
short-run, displacement increases unemployment, exacerbating societal income differentials. 
Widespread layoffs affect market dynamics, increasing the supply of workers and lowering their 
bargaining power, thus driving down wages. In the medium- to long-term, evidence from across 
a number of developed countries shows that having been laid-off contributes to a long-lasting, 
negative impact on workers’ wages once they reenter the workforce (e.g., Hijzen, Upward, & 
Wright, 2010; Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender, 2010). Job displacement in the US has 
disproportionately affected those in lower- to middle-income occupations, such as craftsmen, 
operatives, laborers, and supervisors, as well as those working in manufacturing industries that 
traditionally paid good wages (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, & Wright, 2001; Kletzer, 1998). To 
the extent that laid-off workers are predominately employed in low- and mid-wage jobs, 
downsizing will increase income differentials at the societal level as the middle of the income 
distribution shrinks and the left tail grows and shifts outward.  
Proposition 4: In countries where layoffs affect a larger proportion of workers, income 
inequality at the societal level will be higher.  
FIRM COALITIONS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,                                                     
AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
In the section above, I argued that societal levels of income inequality are determined, in 
part, by decisions made by firms. Specifically, I contended that rates of inequality are affected by 
the extent of employment in firms that predominately utilize practices reflecting a market versus 
an organizational orientation. To what extent, however, do individual employers and their 
executives differ in their preferences for a market or organizational focus? Viewing firms as a set 
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of political coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962), I argue the answer is that because 
these two orientations have distinct implications for how firm resources are divided among 
various stakeholder groups, the power and interests of different organizational actors help 
determine which strategy an employer will pursue. Coalitions consist of groups of individuals 
with similar interests seeking to have their preferences met by the organization. Coalitions 
themselves often have divergent interests, and in most cases, no single group is able to determine 
the goals they want the organization to pursue. In Emerson’s (1962) account of power-
dependence relations, he argues that outcomes from an exchange relationship derive from the 
dependence one party has upon another in obtaining a needed resource (see also Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). What determines the outcomes of negotiations between coalitions is determined, 
in part, by the relative power of each. Coalitional power and changes therein should be reflected 
in the goals, strategies, and practices used by the organization (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013).  
I focus here on two key stakeholder groups that make firm-specific investments (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003): shareholders and executives. I argue that their interests and influence play an 
important role in whether a firm utilizes an organization or market orientation when structuring 
their employment practices. A third stakeholder group, labor (i.e., non-management workers), 
also has a vested interest in the outcome of firm decisions. While I do discuss labor’s influence 
on employment practices in the discussion section, because labor power is typically codified into 
laws that determine the scope and strength of labor protection – including collective bargaining 
rights, which have been studied extensively by scholars of the phenomenon – I offer no formal 
proposition for the influence of labor on income inequality.  
Shareholder Influence: Monitoring and Incentives   
Share ownership structure. Since the writings of Berle and Means (1932), social 
scientists have been interested in understanding how stock ownership structure influences 
organizational action since a firm’s controlling interest directly affects its goals and structure 
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(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Fiss & Zajac, 2004). This influence, however, is moderated by 
the extent to which equity ownership is concentrated. When share ownership is dispersed among 
a large number of shareholders, executives have greater discretion to pursue strategies that 
enhance their own personal interests (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). For example, dispersed 
ownership is associated with a greater proclivity of management to pursue firm growth strategies 
through diversified acquisitions (Amihud & Lev, 1981), to utilize compensation schemes 
rewarding growth rather than performance (Wright, Kroll, & Elenkov, 2002), and to provide 
workers with better paying jobs (Liu, van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost, 2014). Concentrated 
ownership, on the other hand, encourages corporate boards to weigh shareholders' interests more 
heavily when evaluating firm strategy (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & Garcia-Cestona, 2013).  
There are, however, many different types of shareholders, such as families, mutual funds, 
and private equity firms, which have different interests, investment strategies, and time horizons. 
Shareholders fall largely into two types: those taking a longer-term, strategic view and those 
taking a shorter-term, financial view of their investments (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). For 
example, throughout much of Continental Europe, Japan, and Latin America, large shareholders 
tend to be banks and corporations (e.g., customers or suppliers) who use equity stakes as a means 
to pursue strategic interests. The potential loss of commercial business outstrips dividend 
income, motivating these shareholders to prefer strategies that enhance the long-term survival 
prospects of their investments (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). A longer-term perspective translates 
into a preference for firm strategies based on long-term growth and product market domination, 
reinforcing forms of corporate organization that allow firms to benefit from workers’ 
accumulation of firm-specific and other human capital investments (Amable, 2003).  
In contrast, shareholders with a shorter-term, financial view, such as private equity firms 
and many types of institutional investors, are more likely to encourage firms to engage in actions 
that maximize profitability (Cobb, 2015; Useem, 1996), thus performance in equity markets 
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plays a more significant role in corporate strategy (Jensen & Murphy, 2009). One consequence 
of this system is that the market plays a central role in determining firm structure. As John Brian, 
CEO of Sara Lee, stated, “Wall Street can wipe you out. They are the rule-setters. They do have 
their fads, but to a large extent there is an evolution in how they judge companies, and they have 
decided to give premiums to companies that harbor the most profits for the least assets” 
(Lowenstein, 1997). Evidence shows that investors pursuing financial interests motivate firms to 
engage in tactics that increase shareholder value in the short-term and to engage less in long-term 
strategic decision making (Bushee, 1998; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010). The 
prevalence and influence of shareholders with short-term interests, therefore, is likely to be 
associated with firms minimizing their investment in fixed assets and making their boundaries 
more permeable. The benefits accrued to employers from utilizing ILMs are gained over the long 
run (Cappelli, 2001), so a short-term focus reduces their value to the firm and its investors. 
Additionally, several scholars have suggested that the growth of private equity and institutional 
investors pursuing market interests has led to wage cuts and corporate reorganization via layoffs 
(Batt & Appelbaum, 2013; Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Shleifer & Summers, 1988). Shareholders 
concerned with maximizing market returns are also likely to prefer more open, flexible 
employment relationships as it provides for a tighter coupling between wages and productivity 
(Sørensen & Kalleberg, 1981).  
Proposition 5a: In countries where equity is owned predominately by investors pursuing short-
term financial interests, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when 
structuring their employment relationships.  
The structure of equity ownership can also influence executive compensation. 
Throughout many developed countries, the increase in executive pay has been largely due the 
growth of equity-based compensation (Murphy, 2013) achieved, in part, by investors who 
advocated its use (Jung & Dobbin, 2014; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). In recent years, foreign 
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investors – particularly UK- and US-based institutional investors – have increased their 
shareholdings in foreign firms, placing pressure on them to adopt and abide by US corporate 
governance (and employment) practices (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Jacoby, 2005). This leads to higher executive pay and the increased use of equity-based pay in 
firms in which they invest (Murphy, 2013). However, not all shareholders are as willing to 
endorse expansions in executive compensation. Many pension funds, for example, have 
attempted to curb executive pay through proxy contests, and the AFL-CIO tracks the vigilance of 
institutional investors on executive pay issues, showing considerable variance in these investors’ 
willingness to support management over pay issues.  
Taken together, this suggests that firms will be more apt to use performance-based pay, 
external hiring, outsourcing, part-time labor, layoffs, as well as have higher levels of executive 
compensation when a firm’s equity is predominately owned by shareholders pursuing shorter-
term interests and favoring the use of equity-based executive compensation.  
Proposition 5b: In countries where equity is owned predominately by investors favoring high 
levels of equity-based compensation, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation 
when structuring their employment relationships.  
Takeovers and corporate control. A second external monitoring mechanism that 
influences executive decision making is the threat of takeover (Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
Takeovers are coupled frequently with a change in management, thus the market for corporate 
control raises the cost of self-dealing for executives (Manne, 1965) and ensures executives attend 
to the interests of shareholders (Fama, 1980). While countries vary considerably in the extent to 
which hostile takeovers are used to discipline managers (Schneper & Guillen, 2004), studies 
have revealed that when freed from takeover pressures, executives extract higher pay for their 
workers (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 1999, 2003) and pursue stakeholder-friendly practices such 
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as community development (Kacperczyk, 2009). Non-shareholding stakeholder welfare is thus 
thought to be enhanced when management has more autonomy.  
One direct consequence of takeovers is that they often lead to employee layoffs (Conyon 
et al., 2001), which, as discussed above, can exacerbate inequalities in income. Moreover, an 
active market for corporate control discourages management from taking actions that lower firm 
market value, thus making the firm an attractive takeover target. Taking on debt, stock 
repurchases, increasing dividend payments, spinning off under-performing business units, and 
reducing labor costs through various forms of restructuring are all strategies management has 
employed in response to takeover threats (Davis, 2009). While beneficial to shareholders, each of 
these actions undermines firm stability by reallocating resources in order to enhance short-term 
performance. Because the benefits of ILMs are long-term in nature, the risk of takeover makes 
ILMs a less appealing option for employers and workers. For example, changes in share 
ownership are thought to weaken firms' reputations for long-term relationships (Shleifer & 
Summers, 1988), thus threats of and successful hostile takeovers are likely to discourage workers 
from making firm-specific investments. Without such investments, ILMs become less necessary 
and external labor market mechanisms are utilized more frequently. 
Proposition 6: In countries with a more active takeover market, employers will be more likely to 
take a market orientation when structuring their employment relationships.  
Aligning interests through incentives. While the direct impact of executive pay levels 
on income inequality was discussed above, here I suggest that an indirect effect, whereby 
monetary incentives influence executive decision making about what types of employment 
practices to use. Financial theorists have proposed that equity compensation is used to align 
executives’ goals with those of the firm (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and managers with 
equity in the firm are more likely to embrace shareholder concerns and direct the firm in their 
joint interests, thereby reducing the gap between ownership and control (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
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Dalton, 2007). Specifically, stock options provide an incentive for managers to make decisions 
that boost equity values, often with the consequence of lower worker wages and increased 
employment insecurity (Minsky, 1996). Furthermore, such schemes typically have short vesting 
periods that allow executives to reap the rewards of their actions before their full effect may be 
realized, disincentivizing the use of firm strategies based on firm stability and long-term growth 
(Murphy, 1999). Taken together, where monetary incentives are tied more closely to market 
investor interests, executives are likely to utilize firm strategies that favor flexible employment 
relationships and short-term performance. Such a short-term focus discourages the use of ILMs 
and encourages altering firm boundaries through non-standard work arrangements and layoffs.  
Proposition 7: In countries where executive compensation is based primarily on firm financial 
performance, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when structuring their 
employment relationships.  
Executive Power and Decision Making  
While there exist constraints on their discretion, by the nature of their position, top 
executives have considerable power and authority to set firms’ goals and strategies (Fligstein, 
1991). Whether they choose a market or organizational orientation is determined, in part, by their 
own beliefs about the most effective way to structure their employment relationships. These 
schemas, which emerge from prior experience (Skinner, 1953), help determine the goals of and 
guide decisions in the firm (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). 
The functional and educational background of an employer's top executive(s), therefore, are 
likely to play a role in determining the purpose of the corporation as well as its objectives and 
strategies (Fligstein, 1990; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).  
The fields of finance and economics have a strong commitment to the primacy of 
markets. This suggests that executives with a background in these fields will hold more positive 
views toward using market mechanisms to structure employment relationships. CEOs with a 
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background in finance or economics are also thought to consider shareholder interests over those 
of other stakeholders when making strategic decisions (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) as these disciplines 
strongly support the shareholder value orientation. The prevalence of CEOs with a strong 
financial background suggests these firms prefer CEOs "who understand the financial 
ramifications of business decisions" (Sanders, 2011). Evidence shows that CEOs of German 
firms with a law or economics background are more likely to espouse a shareholder value 
orientation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). CEOs with a background in finance have also been found to be 
more likely to engage in downsizing (Budros, 2000).  
In contrast, executives with backgrounds in other disciplines may be less inclined to 
implement market-oriented practices if they conflict with other objectives. For example, 
executives in Germany tend to have PhDs in engineering or science (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) 
and are guided by a desire to achieve technical excellence, rather than pursuing narrow financial 
interests (Lawrence, 1980). Evidence also suggests that firms develop more novel strategies and 
are more likely to alter them over time when its executives have a more diverse background (i.e., 
one spanning a number of functional areas) (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014). 
Given a predisposition toward a market orientation and attention to financial measures of 
performance, I expect that in comparison to firms with CEOs with other backgrounds, CEOs 
with a functional or educational background primarily in finance or economics are more likely to 
structure their employment relationships utilizing a market orientation. 
Proposition 8: In countries where executives have a background predominately in finance or 
economics, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when structuring their 
employment relationships.  
DISCUSSION 
Income inequality is one of the defining social problems of contemporary times (World 
Economic Forum, 2014), and scholars from across the social sciences have sought to better 
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explain where it arises from and to what effect. With but a few exceptions, however, 
explanations ignore the role played by firms. Employers are of great importance to the study of 
the phenomenon because they make decisions about who to hire, how much to pay, and how 
many to employ (Baron, 1984), and, as such, influence rates of income inequality at the societal 
level. Furthermore, how executives are impacted by monitoring structures, incentives, and the 
schemas used when making these choices is squarely in the purview of organizational 
scholarship, making our field uniquely suited to study income inequality. That few have done so 
while having the capacity to add much to the scholarly debate provides an interesting 
opportunity. By introducing a model of how employers influence income inequality at the 
societal level, I hope to provide future researchers a platform for the study of this phenomenon.  
The model I present articulates the distributional consequences of different employment 
practices and how firms come to make them. Specifically, I discuss how three key elements of 
firms' strategy and structure – how employees (including executives) are rewarded for their 
labor, are matched to jobs, and where a firm places its boundaries – affect societal rates of 
income inequality. I theorize that when wage setting and job matching are based primarily on 
internal (external) considerations, income inequality in a society will be lower (higher). In ILMs, 
the wage premium for lower-skilled workers is typically higher than for higher-skilled ones 
(Groshen & Levine, 1998), providing lower levels of between-group income inequality than 
would be experienced outside a firm's boundaries. The desire to maintain norms of fairness also 
implies a smaller disjuncture in wages between workers throughout the hierarchy (Doeringer & 
Piore, 1971). Wages tied to worker productivity and firm performance as well as a reliance on 
external hiring, lead to greater returns to workers’ observable characteristics, such as education, 
credentials, and productivity, creating greater variance in returns to labor. These same 
considerations also influence rates of executive pay such that when firms utilize performance-
based pay, external benchmarking, and external hiring, executive pay will be greater. Moreover, 
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efforts to externalize employment through non-standard work arrangements and layoffs also put 
downward pressure on wages of low- to mid-income workers, further exacerbating wage 
differentials at the societal level. Taken together, whether employers take an organizational 
versus a market focus when structuring their employment relationships has important 
distributional consequences for society. 
I also discuss a number of firm-level factors that help determine whether a firm takes a 
market or organizational orientation. Leveraging insights from power-dependence and socio-
political theories of executive decision making, I argue that firms are composed of a set of 
coalitions with different interests and sources of influence. Because a market versus an 
organizational orientation has implications for how firm resources are allocated between 
stakeholders, the power and interests of different organizational actors helps determine which 
strategy an employer will pursue. Specifically, I contend that the structure of equity ownership, 
the prevalence of a corporate takeover market, the structure of executive compensation, and 
decision making schemas of top executives encourage the adoption of practices associated with a 
market versus an organizational orientation.  
Implications for Organizational Theory  
Earlier contributions to organizational theory, such as the behavioral theory of the firm 
(e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), paid considerable attention to the role coalitional conflict played in 
affecting firm outcomes. The model presented here suggests these same mechanisms may be 
relevant to our understanding of societal-level outcomes. Furthermore, while organizational 
scholars have made many important advances in our understanding of changing employment 
practices and the forces motivating them, scant attention has been paid to the distributional 
consequences of these decisions on society. This omission has had the consequence of leaving 
the study of income inequality to fields of study less likely to consider the role of employers and 
firm-level decision making. The lack of attention to social outcomes is part of a broader trend 
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whereby organizational theory has largely bypassed the study of societal issues and instead 
focused on firm outcomes and inter-organizational dynamics (Perrow, 1986). When social issues 
are considered, such as in the study of corporate social responsibility, researchers too often 
examine firm outcomes to the neglect of studying firms’ impact upon society (see Banerjee, 
2008; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). There is a precedent, however, for the study of social 
issues by organizational scholars, as the impact of hierarchies on individuals and society was a 
central concern of earlier scholarship (e.g., Boulding, 1953). Notably, a number of early accounts 
speculated that the processes and modalities prevalent in organizations directly impacted the 
well-being of their employees (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Whyte, 1956), and more contemporary 
research has found that the type of job one holds (e.g., its position in the organizational 
hierarchy) plays a vital role in outcomes related to individual health and well-being (e.g., 
Marmot et al., 1991). By viewing firm strategy and structure as an important driver of societal-
level income inequality, this model points to employers as key drivers of social welfare and 
suggests that within the purview of organizational theory, researchers should once again explore 
firms as promulgators of societal change (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Stern & Barley, 1996). 
Conceptual work from the structuralist perspective of stratification was acutely interested 
in the impact firms had on their environment, and argued that employers, through their decisions 
about processes of job allocation and wage setting, help determine levels of income stratification 
(Baron & Bielby, 1980). Empirical studies in this milieu, however, documented features of 
organizations giving rise to intra-firm income inequality, without attention given to how firms 
impact inequality in a society (Sørensen, 2007). As a starting point, I take insights from the 
structuralist perspective and combine them with economic and sociological literature on labor 
markets as well as organizational scholarship on employment practices. From this, I develop a 
model that articulates a set of mechanisms through which firm strategy and structure leads to 
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societal-level income inequality. In so doing, I answer recent calls to integrate income inequality 
research and organizational theory (Sørensen & Sorenson, 2007).  
Lastly, while organizational scholars have been largely silent about the factors that lead 
to societal levels of income inequality, the impact of income dispersion on individual outcomes, 
such as motivation and turnover (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012; 
Wade et al., 2006), as well as firm-level outcomes like performance (Bloom, 1999; Fredrickson, 
Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010), have been important areas of inquiry.4 Generating a more 
complete understanding of how firms create income inequality, therefore, may inform interest in 
the impact of income inequality on individual, group, firm, and societal dynamics.  
Implications for the Study of Income Inequality 
Existing perspectives on the rise of income inequality focus primarily on market-based 
explanations (e.g., SBTC, globalization), unions, minimum wages, and tax policy (Morris & 
Western, 1999: 642). While each of these streams have provided valuable insights into the 
drivers of income inequality, the explanations are often not supported by cross-national analyses 
(DiPrete, 2007), suggesting other factors may be important. By failing to consider the role of 
firms in processes of wage setting, job matching, and boundary placement, existing research 
overlooks potentially important firm-level factors driving differences in income inequality over 
time. Employers help determine labor market outcomes (Baron & Bielby, 1980), and research 
indicates that much of the increase in income inequality is due to employers paying similar 
workers differently (Groshen, 1991)."The market is always embodied in specific institutions 
such as corporate hierarchies" (Piketty, 2014: 332); as such, the model I present here extends 
existing research by examining why corporate hierarchies vary in their strategy and structure 
based on factors that influence executive decision making.  
 A firm-centered theory of income inequality may also complement existing theories of 
the phenomenon. For example, research has shown differences in the extent to which computer 
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programmable design tasks are handled by front-line operators versus engineers and whether 
these capital investments lead to labor force reductions. This research suggests employer choice 
determines whether technology is skill-biased and leads to layoffs (e.g., Kelley, 1994; Noble, 
1984). Technology also provides the means for companies to alter their boundaries through 
outsourcing and offshoring (Sahaym, Steensma, & Schilling, 2007). Studies of the effects of 
minimum wage rates may be enriched by considering how many and which workers get sorted 
into low-wage jobs. Incorporating in existing theories how executives come to make these 
decisions suggests the presence of boundary conditions that can add greater precision.  
Future Research Directions 
The model I have developed here is not without limitations. First, while some of the 
constructs I include have well-established, valid measures, others, such as the presence of ILMs, 
do not. Previous research used proxies such as organizational size as an indicator of ILMs (e.g., 
Davis & Cobb, 2010). Over the past 30 years in the US, the firm size-ILM link, however, has 
weakened as many of the largest employers (e.g., Wal-Mart) now pay low wages and do not 
utilize ILMs to the extent that many of the large firms did in decades prior (e.g., General Motors, 
AT&T). Future empirical research, however, can exploit large-scale, matched firm-employee 
data found in many Scandinavian countries, and others such as the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics and the Workplace Employment Relations Study that provide information 
on remuneration, occupational breakdowns, and employment practices of a number of large 
firms in a society. Cross-national comparisons, as proposed here, will likely necessitate 
collaborations between scholars with expertise and data access across countries. 
Second, I do not theorize about the role of labor as a key organizational stakeholder. 
Individually, employees have little power to impact firm strategy, but employee power can be 
enhanced greatly when they can mobilize and act collectively through unions. Important goals of 
unions are to set pay equally across similar workers and to limit the wage disjuncture across 
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different workers, which tends to reduce wage dispersion (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011). 
However, because a number of studies have sought to establish a relationship between unions 
and income inequality, I did not offer propositions about the connection here.  
Notably, however, unions play a crucial role in how much discretion firms have in 
structuring their employment relationships. For example, unions have been shown to deter the 
use of contingent employment relationships (Gramm & Schnell, 2001) and reduce levels of 
executive compensation (Banning & Chiles, 2007). Their ability to influence firm outcomes 
depends greatly on the scope and strength of union representation rights (Beramendi & Cusack, 
2009). In countries like the US, the UK (since 1980), Canada, and New Zealand, for example, 
unions bargain with individual firms and plants, leading to greater intra-industry variance on the 
impact organized labor has on wages, benefits, and conditions of work. This is not the case, 
however, in the Scandinavian countries and in Germany, where systems of codetermination, 
work councils, and other forms of industrial democracy provide workers greater power in 
determining the trajectory of the labor market (Scheve & Stasavage, 2009). While beyond the 
scope of this paper, any discussion of income inequality can be importantly informed by 
examining union density rates and the extent to which collective bargaining is centralized versus 
fragmented as these factors have influence on the types of practices firms use to structure their 
employment relationships (Oskarsson, 2005; Western & Rosenfeld, 2011).  
Finally, my efforts to achieve parsimony led me to focus on a relatively small number of 
employment practices. Other practices, such as those related to high-performance work, may 
affect wage dispersion, and future research can explore additional ways in which employers 
influence rates of income inequality. Moreover, I utilized a single theoretical perspective in 
developing my arguments for how executives choose between a market and organizational 
orientation. Insights from other organizational theories, however, may also shed light on how 
these decisions are made. Below, I briefly elaborate on two such theoretical perspectives.  
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Institutional environment. The formal and informal institutions in a society may also 
play a key role in how employment relationships get set and the extent to which executives have 
the discretion to influence them (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). For example, whether a 
country's system of corporate governance favors minority versus majority shareholders 
influences the types of investors that take equity stakes in firms (Coffee, 2001) as well as how 
active the takeover market is in a country (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). Moreover, labor laws, the 
presence of skill formation institutions, levels of unionization, and centralized wage bargaining 
may play integral roles in employers’ use of ILMs, their ability to use non-standard employment 
relationships, and the prevalence of layoffs (Crouch, Findegold, & Sako, 1999; Dasgupta, 2001). 
Furthermore, in collectivist cultures, inequalities in income are more likely to be seen as 
disruptive and illegitimate. Such concerns, for example, are thought to be a main reason why 
executive compensation is much smaller in Japan than in countries like the US and the UK (The 
Economist, 2010). Future research can explore more closely the regulatory, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive institutions in a society that may impact processes of wage setting, job 
matching, and firm boundary placement.  
Organizational population dynamics. Insights from population ecology emphasize that 
a firm’s strategy is influenced by the social technologies available to it at the time of its founding 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Firms that emerged during eras when institutional and economic factors 
favored either the use of a market or organizational orientation, therefore, may be affected by 
these factors when determinig how employment relationships get structured. For example, firms 
that emerged following the managerial revolution at the turn of the 20th century employed a 
higher proportion of administrative workers than firms founded in older industries (Marquis & 
Tilcsik, 2013). When employment is concentrated in firms that emerged in a period where an 
organization orientation dominated (e.g., in the US from the 1950s to the 1970s), we should 
expect to see firms continue to use practices associated with an organization orientation and 
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greater resistance to efforts to utilize a more market-oriented approach. Future work can explore 
the types of employment relationships that dominated in the eras of firms’ founding to determine 
whether these factors influences rates of income inequality at the societal level.  
CONCLUSION 
Witnessing rising levels of income inequality throughout much of the developed world 
and holding concerns for its impact on society, scholars from across the social sciences have 
made great strides in understanding the phenomenon. However, there is more work that can be 
done to refine, enhance, and expand our knowledge of the factors driving rates of income 
inequality around the world. Considering societal levels of income inequality to be, in part, an 
outcome of processes that set wages, match workers to positions, and determine where firm 
boundaries are placed opens up important and new avenues of research for scholars of both 
income inequality and organizations. While employer practices are not the sole determinant of 
income inequality, they play an important yet understudied role. Accounting for the ways in 
which employer practices influence societal outcomes has the potential to enrich our 
understanding of the dynamics undergirding income differentials and provides organizational 
researchers a starting point to examine this critical social issue.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Most aggregate measures of income inequality include all forms of income, but because 
investment income is disproportionately earned by top earners, a key factor differentiating 
measures of top incomes from those considering lower parts of the distribution is the role of 
investment income versus salary income (Piketty, 2014). In some instances, the distinction 
between investment and labor income gets blurred, particularly in the context of stock-based 
compensation. Across countries, stock option compensation sometimes appears as wage income 
or capital income in tax statistics, depending on the tax law (Atkinson et al., 2011). This makes 
cross-national analyses of stock options on income inequality complex. For the purposes of this 
model, labor income includes the value of options as they are earned as a condition of 
employment.   
2 Based on my own calculations on data taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (Solt, 2014). 
3 I concentrate my review on explanations that involve the setting process and those that are the 
most common explanations for the phenomenon. Other explanations that I do not cover include 
family formation practices (see McCall & Percheski, 2010) and political representation dynamics 
(see Brady & Sosnaud, 2010). 
4 Political scientists are also interested in the impact of income inequality on outcomes such as 
voter behavior (e.g., Meltzer & Richard, 1981). 
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TABLE 1 
Features of Organization and Market Oriented Employment Systems 
  Organizational Orientation Market Orientation 
Wage setting   
 How do wages get set? 
Tied to job using formal job evaluation; based more on 
administrative rules; lower pay variance within and 
across jobs  
Tied to individual using external market mechanism; 
based on skills and performance; larger pay variance 
within and across jobs 
 Goal Internal equity; reduce costs of social comparison 
Externally competitive wages; incentivize worker 
productivity 
 
Job matching   
 
How do workers get matched 
to positions? 
Internal hiring (above entry-level); based on seniority External hiring; based on skills and credentials 
 Goal 
Reduce avoidable turnover; encourage development of 
firm-specific skills 
Just-in-time skill acquisition 
    
Skill development   
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 How do workers gain skills? 
Employer develops talent; on-the-job formal and 
informal training 
Employer acquires talent; reliance on skill development 
outside the firm 
 Goal  Greater stability and predictability of skill supply 
Avoid costs of developing and maintaining excess 
internal talent 
 
Firm boundaries   
 
Where does firm place its 
boundaries?  
Stable boundaries; heavy reliance on stable, full-time 
employment relationships 
Permeable boundaries; heavy reliance on non-standard 
work arrangements and work reorganization 
 Goal  Operational stability Operational flexibility 
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FIGURE 1 
Model of Firms’ Affect on Societal-level Income Inequality 
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FIGURE 2 
Internal Labor Market Mechanisms and Societal-level Income Inequality 
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